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Year in Review Lecture
Milena Sterio*
Good morning! It is a pleasure to be here and share with you my
thoughts on the topic of "Year in Review." As opposed to boring you
with facts, graphs, statistics, and numbers, I have decided to focus
on three of the most significant themes or cases in international
humanitarian law over the past year. These include the International
Criminal Court (ICC) Al Mahdi case; the closing and legacy ofthe two
ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR); and the ongoing conundrum with the situation in Syria.
International Criminal Court Al Mahdi Case

Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, also known as Abou Tourab, was a member
of the radical Islamic group Ansar Eddine, a Malian armed jihadist
group linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Al Mahdi
served as head of the Islamic Police in Timbuktu and was one of
the four commanders of Ansar Eddine during its brutal occupation
of Timbuktu in 2012. During this time, Al Mahdi worked closely
with the leaders of all the armed groups in the area, and, according
to the allegations asserted against Al Mahdi, played an active role
in the occupation of Timbuktu.
How did the Al Mahdi case wind up before the ICC? The Malian
government itself referred the situation in Mali to the Court in
2012. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) then opened an official
investigation into alleged crimes committed in Mali in January 2013,
and in February 2013 the Malian government and the ICC signed a
cooperation agreement in accordance with Section IX of the Rome
Statute. On September 18, 2015, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an
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arrest warrant against Al Mahdi. At this particular point in time, Al
Mahdi was detained in a prison in Niger, and on September 26, 2015,
he was transferred to ICC authorities by the government of Niger.
On March 24, 2016, charges against Al Mahdi, consisting of war
crimes constituted by attacks against religious and cultural sites,
were confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber I. The ICC indicted Al Mahdi
on several charges of war crimes, specifically intentional attacks
against ten religious and historic buildings and monuments. Article
8.2(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides that war crimes
include "intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated
to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives." All the buildings
that Al Mahdi was charged with attacking had been under UNESCO
protection, and most had been listed as world heritage sites.

In addition to the ICC's charges against Al Mahdi, human rights
groups accused Al Mahdi of other crimes and have encouraged the
OTP to consider credible allegations of Al Mahdi's involvement in
crimes committed against civilians, including rape, sexual slavery,
and forced marriage. Al Mahdi indicated that he would plead guilty
on March 1, 2016; his trial opened on August 22, 2016, and concluded
within a single week. The Court sentenced Al Mahdi to nine years of
imprisonment on September 27, 2016.
In the most recent development on August 17, 2017, Trial Chamber
VIII of the ICC issued a Reparations Order in the Al Mahdi case,
concluding that Al Mahdi is liable for 2.7 million euros in expenses for
individual and collective reparations for the community of Timbuktu
for intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic
buildings in that city. Noting that Al Mahdi is indigent, the Chamber
encouraged the Trust Funds for Victims (TFV) to complement
the reparations award and directed the TFV to submit a draft
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implementation plan for February 16, 2018. The Chamber highlighted
the importance of cultural heritage and stressed that, because of their
purpose and symbolism, most cultural property and cultural heritage
sites are unique and ofsentimental value. Their destruction thus carries
a message of terror and helplessness, destroys part of humanity's
shared memory and collective consciousness, and renders humanity
unable to transmit its values and knowledge to future generations.
While some have applauded the ICC prosecution of Al Mahdi as a
victory for the institution and as a ground breaking legal precedent,
others have criticized the court's decision to go after a relatively little
known defendant, for a relatively insignificant crime.
Commentators have applauded the Al Mahdi case and called it a big
victory for the ICC. Let me briefly summarize some of the main
arguments in favor of the Al Mahdi case as a victory for the ICC.
First, Al-Mahdi's trial was short and efficient, which is important for a
Court that has been hobbled by inexcusably long proceedings. The ICC
has a small budget, and completing an efficient trial without expending
many resources represents an important legal accomplishment for the
Court and will arguably free up the ICC to pursue other cases and
alleged criminals. Al Mahdi is the first ever defendant in the ICC
to plead guilty. From the start of his case, he promised to cooperate
with the ICC-in exchange, perhaps, for a lenient sentence. Thus,
prosecuting Al Mahdi, while knowing in advance that the defendant
would plead guilty and cooperate with prosecutors, and also perhaps
provide information about other future cases, would appear to have
been a particularly efficient use of the ICC's limited resources.
Second, the ICC has been perceived as a largely inefficient institution
as cases against other alleged criminals have languished. Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir has been free since becoming the first
person charged by the ICC for genocide. Joseph Kony, the notorious
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leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, continues to wreak havoc
in Central Africa, ten years after being indicted. The trials of
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William
Ruto collapsed as a result of a lethal combination of shoddy case
construction by ICC prosecutors and Kenyan political interference.
According to some, securing a conviction against an Islamic terrorist
such as Al Mahdi will send the right message that the ICC is efficient
and capable of arresting individuals and successfully completing
trials within a reasonable time period.
Third, Al Mahdi's surrender to the ICC was accomplished through
the cooperation of both Niger and Mali, two African states. This
cooperation may help the ICC to counter criticism of bias against
the African continent and the perception that African states are
somehow against the institution.
Fourth, Al Mahdi's evidence and testimony could be of use during
future prosecutions; as I already mentioned, he has proven to be more
than willing to cooperate with ICC investigators and prosecutors. Al
Mahdi may have been targeted by the ICC because of this promise, as
the ICC may have believed that Al Mahdi's cooperation and eventual
testimony would potentially help in bringing other perpetrators
in Mali to account. As one commentator observed, "If al-Mahdi
provides solid testimony and evidence of other crimes, he could
emerge as an extremely useful resource not only for the ICC but for
accountability in Mali more generally." This possibility may also help
to alleviate the skeptics' concern that the ICC should not be focusing
on the destruction of property, but should instead focus on violence
committed against populations and individuals.
Fifth, Al Mahdi's conviction may bolster the Court's image as
a relevant institution seen as prosecuting crimes that shock the
conscience of mankind, such as the destruction of UNESCO sites.
Because of its limited jurisdictional reach, the ICC has been unable
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to prosecute individuals responsible for the destruction of cultural
sites in places such as Palmyra or Bamiyan. Securing a conviction
against an individual accused of similar destruction in an ICC
member state, where the court does have jurisdiction, signals that the
destruction of cultural heritage is a war crime of legitimate concern
to the international community.

In other words, the ICC showed that accountability for cultural
crimes is possible. The Court's action also signaled other shifts. Most
crucially, the Court tapped into global outrage about the destruction
of cultural heritage sites. While the Court has no jurisdiction in
Syria or Iraq, where Islamic State fighters have wantonly obliterated
historic sites, it could do something about the destruction ofTimbuktu
shrines. In prosecuting Al Mahdi, the ICC joined with UNESCO to
form a new front line against the violent destruction of culture.
While many have pointed out the limitations ofthe Al Mahdi precedent
in terms of deterring future war criminals tempted to destroy other
cultural sites, the Al Mahdi case does demonstrate that the international
community cares about the protection of buildings and monuments
and is willing to expend focus and energy on this issue.
Sixth, the Al Mahdi case is a "first" of many kinds. This case marks
the first time that the destruction of cultural sites has been prosecuted
as a war crime at the ICC. It is also the first time that an Islamic
radical has been prosecuted at the ICC. Finally, it is the first time that
an ICC defendant has pleaded guilty.
Critics have pointed out that the case may not be such a welcome
development in international criminal law. For example, scholars
have criticized the Al Mahdi case as stretching the limits ofthe ICC to
a breaking point because the case fails to respect two core principles
of the ICC: gravity and complementarity.
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First, gravity.
The ICC was established to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern. Article 17(l)(d) of
the Rome Statute provides that a case is inadmissible before the ICC
if the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court. The Prosecutor has stated in the context of the Al Mahdi case
that "attacks against religious buildings are so grave that they warrant
action by the international community." One has to wonder, however,
whether the destruction of buildings should qualify as one of the most
serious crimes of international concern. In another recent case, the so
called Flotilla incident, where Israeli special forces killed ten activists
on board a vessel that had been about to breach the Israeli naval
blockade of Gaza, the ICC OTP defined the principle of gravity as:
(i) whether the individuals or groups of persons that are likely
to be the object of an investigation, include those who may bear
the greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes committed; and
(ii) the gravity of the crimes committed within the incidents
which are likely to be the focus of an investigation.
Subsequently, the OTP defined the elements that are to be taken into
account when assessing the gravity of the crimes, namely, the "scale,
nature, manner of commission of the crimes and their impact."
With this precedent in mind, it is important to address two questions:
whether Al Mahdi bears the greatest responsibility for the alleged
crimes, and whether the crimes themselves are of sufficient gravity.
First, it is unclear whether Al Mahdi is indeed the most responsible
for the crimes. While it is likely that he had been involved in the
destruction of the religious buildings, it is equally likely that other
members of the Islamic groups were similarly involved in the
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planning and commission of these crimes. It has been suggested that
Al Mahdi is on trial because all of the other leaders of the various
extremist militia groups that operated in the region have been killed
or otherwise escaped. This suggestion would indicate that Al Mahdi
was selected for prosecution for pragmatic reasons, which had little to
do with the gravity principle.
Second, it is uncertain whether the war crime ofdestruction ofcultural
property is grave enough to warrant prosecution at the ICC. Despite
the Rome Statute's prohibitions against the destruction of religious
buildings, one must assume that the drafters envisaged that these
crimes would only be prosecuted once committed in combination with
other crimes that qualify as a war crime. For example, in the current
trial of Bosco Ntaganda, the defendant is facing twelve war crimes
charges and five charges of crimes against humanity, in addition to
the destruction of cultural and religious property.
Thus, the Ntaganda case seems to pass the gravity threshold more
easily than the Al Mahdi case. Although the destruction of cultural
and religious buildings may constitute an attack on humanity as a
whole, as recent ISIS-perpetrated attacks on the cultural heritage
of Syria may demonstrate, this does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that the ICC should prosecute the perpetrators. The
gravity threshold imposes a limitation on the Court: in light of its
limited resources, the Court should focus on the prosecution of those
most responsible for serious crimes. It may be argued that Al Mahdi's
alleged crimes are not grave enough.
Second, complementarity.
It is questionable whether the Al Mahdi prosecution satisfies the

principle of complementarity. The ICC is not supposed to interfere
with national prosecutions, and the Court should only prosecute
suspects if a state is not able or willing to prosecute. According to
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Article 17(l)(a) of the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible when it
is being investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction
over it, unless the state is genuinely unwilling or unable to carry
out the investigation or prosecution. In other words, if a state is able
and willing to prosecute an individual, that state should be given the
opportunity to do so, and the ICC should step away.
Al Mahdi had already been indicted on terrorism charges in Niger
before the ICC issued its arrest warrant. When Niger was informed
that the ICC wanted to prosecute Al Mahdi, Nigerois authorities
transferred Al Mahdi and relinquished jurisdiction over the case.
Niger never stated that it was unwilling or unable to prosecute Al
Mahdi, and the ICC authorities themselves never bothered with
the complementarity issue. Thus, it seems that the ICC decision to
prosecute al Mahdi is contrary to the complementarity principle, and,
in light ofthe fact that the case may not pass the gravity threshold, one
has to wonder whether Al Mahdi's prosecution should have remained
in the hands of Niger authorities.
While the Al Mahdi case may be applauded as a precedent-setting
victory for the ICC as an institution and for international criminal
law in general, the case can also be criticized as an improper use of
the Court and of its limited resources to prosecute a lesser-known
defendant for relatively insignificant crimes. The case remains
relevant, however, for another reason: it demonstrates that the ICC
may function properly if cases are carefully selected and referring
states actively cooperate in the defendant's arrest and prosecution. It
may be better for the ICC to pursue lesser-known defendants if the
OTP determines that a conviction can likely be secured with limited
resources, than to issue arrest warrants against defendants who are
unlikely to find their way to The Hague. Limited justice may be
better than no justice at all.
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Closing and Legacy of Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals

As all of you know, the Rwanda tribunal officially closed, having
completed all of its trial and appellate-level work, at the end of 2015.
The ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is
also coming to a close. The Yugoslavia Tribunal is currently finishing
its last trial in the Mladic case Uudgment is expected in November
2017). In the last appellate case, Prlic et al., the appellate judgment is
also expected in November 2017. Remaining proceedings in the cases
ofKaradiic, Sdelj, and Stanisic & Simatovic are under the jurisdiction
of the so-called Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.
The Mechanism has been mandated to perform a number of essential
functions previously carried out by the ICTY and the ICTR and has
assumed responsibility for, inter alia, the enforcement of sentences,
administrative review, assignment of cases, review proceedings,
appeal proceedings, contempt, requests for revocation of the referral
of cases to national jurisdictions, the variation of witness protection
measures, access to materials, disclosure, changes in classification
of documents, and requests for compensation and assignment of
counsel. In carrying out these multiple functions, the Mechanism
maintains the legacies of these two pioneering ad hoc international
criminal courts and strives to reflect best practices in the field of
international criminal justice.
With the closing of these ad hoc tribunals, an important chapter in
international criminal law has come to an end. The ICTY and the
ICTR played crucial roles in the development ofinternational criminal
law four decades post-Nuremberg. They reignited the development of
this field oflaw, and their case law contributed toward the fine-tuning
of complex legal doctrines, such as genocide, superior or command
responsibility, the definition of international armed conflict, the
prosecution of crimes of sexual violence, and many others. What are
the legacies of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals?
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In the context ofinternational criminal tribunals, scholars have defined
"legacy" to mean a lasting impact, most notably on bolstering the
rule of law in a particular society by conducting effective trials while
also strengthening domestic capacity to do so. Legacy, in this context,
implies the extent to which a particular court has had a significant
effect by modeling best practices in handling the individual cases
and compiling a historical record of the conflict. Legacy also means
laying the groundwork for future efforts to prevent a recurrence
of crimes by offering precedents for legal reform, building faith in
judicial processes, and promoting greater civic engagement on issues
of accountability and justice. This type of legacy is supposed to be
long lasting and continue to have an impact even after the work
of the tribunal is completed.
A 2008 United Nations High Commissioner's Report on maximizing
the legacy of hybrid courts asserted that the need for such tribunals to
leave a legacy is firmly accepted as part of United Nations' policy. In
addition to the above view of legal legacy and impact, tribunals can
have other types of roles that can meaningfully affect the pursuit of
justice and human rights. Professors Kimi King and James Meernik
have described the core missions of the ICTY's mandate (to bring
to justice those responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law) as follows: (1) developing the Tribunals' functional
and institutional capacities; (2) interpreting, applying, and developing
international humanitarian and criminal law; (3) attending to and
interacting with the various stakeholders who have vested interests;
and (4) promoting deterrence and fostering peace-building to prevent
future aggression and conflict.
This framework is also applicable to the ICTR, as this Tribunal
was charged with the same mandate as the ICTY, with the addition
of promoting national reconciliation in Rwanda. In light of the
above, "legacy" can be defined more broadly as the enduring
influence of the Tribunals' work and processes on the ideals,
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Thus, while the Tribunals' legacy is equally important in the
development of domestic justice and human rights more broadly, the
focus of my remarks today is on the field of international criminal
law (ICL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). What is the
significance, impact, and legacy of the ad hoc tribunals through this
particular lens? It is my hope that the legacy of ad hoc tribunals in
the fields of ICL and IHL will be of particular assistance to those
who work with the International Criminal Court (ICC), as much
of the ad hoc tribunals' case law has served and will serve as
important precedent within the ICC, and as the ICC will most likely
continue to enhance the same IHL principles and doctrines that the
ad hoc tribunals have developed.
First, the ad hoc tribunals have contributed to the
development of ICL by successfully charging and convicting
defendants of genocidal offenses.
The Rwanda Tribunal in the Akayesu case became the first
international tribunal to enter a judgment for genocide, as well as
the first to interpret the definition of genocide set forth in the 1948
Geneva Conventions. In the Kambanda case, also before the Rwanda
Tribunal, the defendant pied guilty to genocide, marking the first time
in the history ofICL that an accused person admitted responsibility
for genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide. By accepting this
guilty plea in the Kambanda case, the Rwanda Tribunal became the
first international tribunal since Nuremberg to issue a judgment against
a former head of state. In another case (Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and
Ngeze), the Rwanda Tribunal convicted members of the Rwandan
media by holding them responsible for broadcasts intended to inflame
the public to commit acts of genocide.
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The Yugoslavia Tribunal was the first international criminal tribunal
to enter a genocide conviction in Europe. In April 2004, in the case
against Radislav Krstic, the Appeals Chamber determined that
genocide was committed in Srebrenica in 1995, through the execution
ofmore than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys following the take
over of the town by Bosnian Serb forces. Several other completed
ICTY cases relating to the Srebrenica events have ensured that the
genocide has been well documented and, in the words of ICTY
President Theodor Meron, "consigned to infamy."
According to the appellate judgment in the Krstic case, "Those who
devise and implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the
manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions
provide. This is a crime against all humankind, its harm being felt not
only by the group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity."
In sum, the ad hoc tribunals have significantly contributed to the

prosecution of the crime of genocide and toward the notion that
genocide is a crime against all that will never again be tolerated
by the international community.
Second, the ad hoc tribunals have contributed to the development of
ICL and IHL by developing case law on crimes of sexual violence and
by focusing on specific gender issues. In theAki:ryesu case, the Rwanda
Tribunal for the first time defined the crime of rape in international
criminal law and recognized rape as a means ofperpetrating genocide.
The Rwanda Tribunal created a special unit for gender issues and
assistance to victims of genocide, choosing to focus on gender issues
and to provide support and care to the victims of genocide. In this
manner, the tribunals have, in addition to developing case law on
crimes of sexual violence, created a participatory legacy-the idea
that victims of serious crimes have a voice within international
criminal prosecutions of such crimes. This idea, for better or for
worse, is squarely present within the Rome Statute of the ICC.
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The Yugoslavia Tribunal has also played a historic role in the
prosecution of wartime sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia
and has paved the way for a more robust adjudication of such
crimes worldwide. From the first days of the Tribunal's mandate,
investigations were conducted into reports of systematic detention
and rape of women, men, and children. More than a third of those
convicted by the ICTY have been found guilty of crimes involving
sexual violence. Such convictions are one ofthe Tribunal's pioneering
achievements. They have ensured that treaties and conventions that
have existed on paper throughout the 20th Century have finally been
put in practice, and violations have been punished.
The ICTY took groundbreaking steps to respond to the imperative of
prosecuting wartime sexual violence. Together with its sister tribunal
for Rwanda, the Tribunal was among the first courts of its kind to
bring explicit charges ofwartime sexual violence, and to define gender
crimes such as rape and sexual enslavement under customary law.
The ICTY was also the first international criminal tribunal to enter
convictions for rape as a form of torture and for sexual enslavement
as crime against humanity, as well as the first international tribunal
based in Europe to pass convictions for rape as a crime against
humanity, following a previous case adjudicated by the ICTR. The
ICTY proved that effective prosecution of wartime sexual violence is
feasible and provided a platform for the survivors to talk about their
suffering. That ultimately helped to break the silence and the culture
of impunity surrounding these terrible acts. In addition, the ICTY
established a robust Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS), which
provided the witnesses with assistance prior to, during and after their
testimony, ranging from practical issues to psychological counseling
during their stay in The Hague. In this manner, the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, like the Rwanda Tribunal, has contributed significantly
to the legacy of developing and prosecuting gender-specific crimes
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and crimes of sexual violence, and to ensuring meaningful victim
participation in the adjudication process.
Third, both ad hoc tribunals have contributed toward the development
of the doctrine of superior responsibility by holding that superior
responsibility applies to civilians in leadership positions and that it
is not confined to purely military leaders. This contribution by the ad
hoc tribunals is particularly relevant in light of modern-day warfare
where conflicts are often fought outside of well-defined militaries and
where orders and policies are often crafted by non-military leaders.
Fourth, the ad hoc tribunals have established a legacy of cooperation
and impact on domestic jurisdictions between international tribunals
and national authorities. Multiple countries have signed agreements
on the enforcement of Rwanda Tribunal's sentences (Mali, Benin,
France, Italy, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, and Sweden). These
agreements illustrate the important role national authorities play in
ensuring that those convicted of serious violations of international
law serve their sentences in compliance with international detention
standards. In addition, the Rwanda Tribunal upheld the first referral of
an international criminal indictment to Rwandan national authorities
for trial, in the case against Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi. A total of eight
ICTR cases have now been referred to Rwanda. Two additional cases
have been referred to France for trial. Monitoring in all referred cases
is presently being conducted by the Mechanism.
Throughout its existence, the ICTY OTP has worked closely with the
new states and territories that emerged from the former Yugoslavia
on their domestic prosecutions. In the aftermath of the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH), returning displaced persons and refugees
voiced fears about arbitrary arrests on suspicion of war crimes. To
protect against this, the OTP agreed to operate a "Rules of the Road"
scheme under which local prosecutors were obliged to submit case
files to The Hague for review. The Rules of the Road procedure,
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established under the Rome Agreement of February 18, 1996,
regulated the arrest and indictment of alleged perpetrators of war
crimes by national authorities.
As part of the Tribunal's contribution to the reestablishment of
peace and security in the region, the ICTY prosecutor agreed to
provide an independent review of all local war crimes cases. If a
person was already indicted by the OTP, he could be arrested by
the national police. If the national police wished to make an arrest
where there was no prior indictment, they had to send their evidence
to the OTP. Under the Rome Agreement, decisions of the OTP
became binding on local prosecutors.
To ensure as many persons as possible suspected of war crimes are
brought to justice, the OTP has provided assistance to national bodies
in the region by passing on evidence that may be of use in local
investigations and by transferring whole cases for prosecution locally.
A dedicated transition team within the OTP was tasked with handing
over to national courts cases involving intermediate- and lower
ranking accused. Such cases have included case files of suspects
investigated by the OTP but where no indictments were ever issued,
resulting in the referral of some files with investigative material to
authorities in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, which have then pursued
these cases. Secondly, despite indictments issued by the ICTY, a
total of eight cases involving thirteen accused have been referred to
courts in the former Yugoslavia, mostly to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
pursuant to Rule l lbis ofthe Rules ofProcedure and Evidence. On the
basis of an ICTY indictment and the supporting evidence provided by
the Tribunal's prosecution, these cases are then tried in accordance
with the national laws of the state in question.
Finally, the OTP has promoted regional cooperation among national
prosecutors. The ICTY prosecution strongly supports efforts to
enhance cooperation in criminal matters between states of the former
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Yugoslavia, as it is an essential step towards rebuilding trust and justice
in the region. Successful trials before national courts require that
prosecutors in neighboring countries can collaborate in the collection
of evidence and securing witnesses. OTP officials have taken part in
several regional meetings, facilitating the creation of good working
relationships between the prosecutors in the different states.
Thus, the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals have created a significant
legacy of cooperation with national authorities and have developed
specific models of cooperation that have contributed toward the
rebuilding of national justice systems.
Fifth, the ad hoc tribunals have created a significant legacy in
the operational sense by establishing specific case management
strategies for the prosecution of complex international crimes and by
establishing particular evidentiary procedures resulting in the long
term preservation of evidence that will enable national jurisdictions
to prosecute additional cases in the future. For example, the Rwanda
Tribunal held special deposition proceedings in the case concerning
Felicien Kabuga to preserve evidence for use at trial once he is
arrested. Similar proceedings were later held in the cases of two other
fugitives: Augustin Bizimana and Protais Mpiranya. By holding
these proceedings, the ICTR is ensuring that the passage oftime does
not jeopardize the international community's ability to bring these
suspects to trial when they are finally apprehended.
The ICTY has also established specific evidentiary standards
regarding victims of crimes of sexual violence, by allowing them to
testify anonymously-witnesses have been able to testify under a
pseudonym, with face and voice distortion in video feeds, or in closed
session. Through the development of its rules of procedure, the ICTY
has also sought to protect the victims of sexual violence from abusive
lines of questioning during testimony. The ad hoc tribunals have thus
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left behind an operational legacy, which will undoubtedly serve as a
model for future international criminal prosecutions.
The Ongoing Situation in Syria

The last theme of my remarks focuses on Syria-both in terms of
the recent United States' use of force against the Assad leadership,
as well as in terms of creating an accountability mechanism
for crimes committed in Syria.
Back in 2013, President Obama drew a "red line" and threatened that
the United States would use force against the Syrian regime in the
wake of the latter's use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians.
Obama ultimately decided against using force in Syria, but President
Trump reversed this decision and launched several air strikes against
Syrian President Assad's forces in 2017. President Trump offered the
following justification for the United States air strikes against Syria:
(1) That it was in the vital national security interest ofthe United States
to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons;
(2) that Syria used banned chemical weapons, violated its obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention and ignored the urging of
the UN Security Council; and (3) that the refugee crisis continued
to deepen and the region continued to destabilize, threatening the
United States and its allies.
Most international law experts would agree that the United States' use
of force in Syria this year is illegal. As we all know, international law
allows the use of force in two limited situations: pursuant to Security
Council authorization and/or in self-defense. No particular Security
Council resolution has authorized the use of force in Syria, and it is
very difficult for the United States, located thousands of miles away,
to claim that it has somehow been threatened by the Assad regime
and that it must act in self-defense.
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The United States' use of force in Syria is significant however for
another reason: this intervention can be analyzed from a different
standpoint-that it may be acceptable (while not legal) for states
to act outside the framework of the UN Charter when deemed
necessary or when pursuing a "legitimate aim." Many of you may
remember that this was the argument used to justify the NATO air
strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. In 2013,
the U.K. Prime Minister's Office argued, in the wake of the ongoing
Syrian crisis, that a state could take exceptional measures in order
to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe
in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical
weapons by the Syrian regime.
According to this argument, such a legal basis is available, under
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, provided that a set of
conditions is met. These conditions require that (1) there is "convincing
evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a
whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring
immediate and urgent relief''; (2) it is "objectively clear that there is
no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be save";
and (3) the force used is "necessary and proportionate to the aim of
relief of humanitarian need."
The U.S. military action in Syria has resurrected debates regarding
the humanitarian intervention exception to the general international
law ban on the use of force. As of today, most of us would agree that
humanitarian intervention has not become a norm of positive law.
Moreover, in the Syrian context, it appears that American air strikes
have not contributed toward a broader humanitarian mission and cannot
be easily interpreted as constituting part of a larger humanitarian
operation. Thus, the humanitarian intervention exception does not
provide an easy legal basis for the American use offorce against Syria.
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The Syrian situation however underscores and highlights the
limitations of international law. Many states in the international
community have reacted to the U.S. actions in Syria with approval;
such approval may reflect a political understanding for this course of
action chosen by the Unites States in the face ofthe crimes committed,
rather than legal acquiescence. The U.S. military action in Syria does
not constitute the first time that the prohibition on the use of force has
been violated and not sanctioned by the international community.
However, this should not necessarily mean that the legitimacy of
the UN Charter is diminished. Instead, the U.S. military action in
Syria highlights the limits of international law and its inherent tie
to international relations and geopolitics: the UN Security Council,
the only international law body authorized to officially "bless" the
use of force against a sovereign state, is often blocked and unable
to take legal action, thus resulting in a unilateral use of force by the
United States in an illegal yet perhaps legitimate manner. The obvious
risk that such unilateral military action creates is that although the
attack may be seen as morally or ethically legitimate, it nonetheless
results in acts committed outside the purview of international law.
This dangerously opens the door to using force under possible false
pretenses in the future. Of course, the same false pretenses could be
pursued within the boundaries of the existing legal framework, but at
least the law acts as a barrier in limiting the recourse to force in such
situations. In sum, the U.S. intervention in Syria has sparked new
debates regarding the limits of international law and regarding the
utility and appropriateness of the humanitarian law exception.
Another important consequence of the U.S. military action in Syria
relates to the law applicable to this conflict. Until recently, there
was a conflict between ISIS and the Assad regime together with a
conflict between the U.S. (and the international coalition) and ISIS,
which both qualified as non-international armed conflicts (NIAC).
The U.S. attack against Syria could transform the conflict into an

98

Milena Sterio

international armed conflict (IAC) between the United States and
Syria, meaning that a different and more extensive set of rules will
apply. Depending on the position adopted, this could lead to either the
internationalization of the entire conflict in Syria, meaning that there
would be an IAC between all the actors (including ISIS) or that there
would be a situation of mixed conflicts, an IAC between the United
States and Syria and an NIAC for all the other actors, which in turn
would lead to different applicable rules.
Finally, the Syrian situation has resulted in an ongoing debate within
our professional circles regarding the best accountability mechanism
to address violations of ICL and IHL committed in Syria. While all
agree that those responsible for such violations should face justice,
many disagree as to which form of justice-international, hybrid,
or domestic. The ICC, because of its jurisdictional limitations, is of
limited use in Syria. A new Syria tribunal could be established either
pursuant to a true international model, similar to the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda tribunals, or pursuant to a hybrid model, similar to
the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Lebanese Tribunal. Or,
accountability could be imposed through domestic justice, assuming
that the Syrian leadership is reformed and able and willing to meet the
demands of accountability. To conclude, Syria may, sadly, preoccupy
our legal minds for years to come.
Other than the A/ Mahdi conviction, the international law themes ofthe
past year that I have addressed here today have not been happy. This
conclusion, however, does not diminish the role of international law
and, in particular, of international lawyers, in matters of international
justice. I encourage all of us to continue our hard work in the field of
international humanitarian law and to continue to contribute toward
the development of this area of the law.

